Quick Answer: Quad9 stops answering DNS queries from France on Tuesday, November 24, 2026. A Paris court fined the Swiss non-profit for refusing to block pirate sports-streaming domains for beIN Sports. Quad9 says it cannot afford the roughly 20 similar cases still pending, so leaving is its only option.
Quad9 runs the free 9.9.9.9 resolver, which blocks malware and phishing. It isn't leaving over money or a lack of users. It's leaving because a French court wants resolvers to enforce sports piracy rules, and the penalties add up faster than a small non-profit can absorb. Here's what the case shows about the law, the technology, and the cost of putting copyright enforcement at the DNS layer. Most coverage stops at the headline, and the details are where the problem lives.
What Quad9 Leaving France Means for Your Network
A DNS resolver turns a name like example.com into an IP address your device can connect to. Most people use their ISP's resolver without knowing it. Public resolvers such as Google's 8.8.8.8, Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1, Cisco's OpenDNS, and Quad9's 9.9.9.9 are alternatives anyone can point a device or network at.
Quad9 is unusual. It was founded in 2017 by the Global Cyber Alliance, IBM, and Packet Clearing House. In 2021 it moved its legal seat to Zürich, hosted by SWITCH, so its privacy promises would rest on Swiss law. It keeps no user records, and its own about page claims over 670 million blocks a day across 230+ resolver clusters.
That's why the exit matters beyond one provider. Mullvad shut down its public encrypted DNS service on November 2, 2026, and moved default-settings Mullvad Browser users to Quad9. Quad9's announcement lists dozens of French networks it sees traffic from, including DINUM, France Travail, CEA, Institut Pasteur, RENATER, SNCF, and several hospitals. Those networks may not know their resolver is about to vanish.
And when a resolver disappears, users rarely see a helpful message. As Cloudflare put it, the result is that "their Internet will simply stop working."
How a 2021 Sports Law Reached a DNS Resolver
The legal basis is Article L.333-10 of the Code du sport, created by Law 2021-1382 of October 25, 2021. That same law merged HADOPI and the CSA into the regulator Arcom. The article lets a sports rightsholder ask the president of the Paris judicial court for "dynamic" blocking orders. These cover sites already identified, plus mirror domains notified later through Arcom.
The orders can target anyone "susceptible de contribuer à y remédier," meaning any person able to help stop the infringement. That phrase is what pulls DNS resolvers into scope. The enforcement path went like this:
- December 2023: Canal+ sued Cloudflare, Google, and Cisco to force DNS blocking of football piracy sites.
- June 2024: Cisco pulled OpenDNS out of France on June 28, citing an order issued under L.333-10.
- December 2024: Canal+ won orders against Quad9 and Vercara. Quad9 couldn't geolocate users, so it blocked the domains for everyone.
- March 2026: The Paris Court of Appeal (RG 24/09372) became the first appellate court to approve DNS blocking under L.333-10. It wrote that "any filtering measure can be circumvented, and this possibility does not render the measures in question ineffective."
- July 2026: Parliament passed Law 2026-725, which added an automated real-time blocking system run by Arcom. TorrentFreak reported that "ARCOM's agents no longer approve each block in advance."
The circle of targets only widened. Quad9's own CTO has called the new system "recklessly dangerous."
Here's where it gets sharper. The May 13, 2026 beIN order (RG 26/02207) required Quad9 to block IPTV sites showing the WTA women's tennis tour. It started with six domains and grew to 58 through Arcom notifications.
The €1,000 Penalty Is Not the Real Problem
On October 21, 2026, the court fined Quad9 €1,000 per day (RG 26/11882). Headlines often cite €580,000 a day. That was beIN's request, not the penalty. beIN asked for €10,000 per day for each domain still reachable, and across 58 domains that adds up to €580,000. The judge set €1,000 per day in total, running until the WTA season ended on November 14.
Taken alone, that's survivable. Quad9 has said the total came to about €24,000 over three weeks. The problem is the pipeline. Quad9 says it "cannot survive the accumulation of penalties yet to be assessed in 20 other pending cases." Each case runs for a full sports season, the domain lists keep growing, and Arcom's automated system feeds them.
The reasoning in the ruling is the part worth reading closely. Quad9 argued it couldn't implement geolocated blocking. The court (para. 16) replied that Quad9 "appears to contradict itself," because it already "applies automated filtering strictly limited to cybersecurity to neutralise malicious domains on a global scale."
In other words, a resolver's ability to drop a name for everyone was treated as proof it could drop a name for France. Paragraph 18 then made the decisive point: "Bound by an obligation of means, the Quad9 foundation states that it implements none in order to execute the decision. This circumstance alone justifies the imposition of a penalty."
Refusing to try was enough. Most people stop here, but this is the detail that should worry every resolver operator.
Why Quad9 Can't Just Comply
Quad9 is often asked why it doesn't just block the domains. It considered three options, and the table below shows why each one fails.
| Option | What it means | Main problem | Evidence from this case |
|---|---|---|---|
| Block globally | Drop the names for every user worldwide | A French court sets what users in Brazil, Kenya, or Germany can resolve | Done for Canal+ in December 2024; DNS4EU does the same today |
| Geo-block France | Block only IPs geolocated to France | GeoIP is a probabilistic guess, not a legal fact about a person | In Sony Music v. Quad9, a VPN reached the content "from Germany," and Quad9 was fined for contempt |
| Pay and fight | Contest the order in court | Costs and time are unsustainable for a small non-profit | Quad9 won in Dresden in December 2023 but cited "several years, six figures of cost" |
| Exit the market | Stop resolving in the jurisdiction | Users lose service with little warning | Quad9 leaves France on November 24, 2026 |
The global option is the one that should alarm people outside France. Quad9's announcement asks how France would react if other nations imposed their laws on French users through DNS. The answer is obvious, and the reverse should be too. Nothing in this logic is limited to sports. Once global blocking is accepted, any court in any country can add names to everyone's resolver.
The geo-blocking option failed in practice too. A resolver that keeps no user records has no reliable way to define a "French user." Quad9 told TorrentFreak, "There is no legally useful way for us to define a French user."
That leaves exit. Quad9 wrote in 2025 that compliance costs routine for Google are, for "small, mission-driven nonprofits like Quad9, … an existential threat."
Why DNS Blocking Doesn't Stop Piracy
Even on its own terms, DNS blocking doesn't do what rightsholders want. The DNS holds pointers, not content. Quad9's Dresden write-up says, "The DNS does not contain content - it is a system designed for delivery only of pointers." The pirate server stays online and keeps serving anyone who reaches it another way.
Bypassing a resolver block takes seconds. Quad9 notes there are thousands of other open resolvers. Users can also run their own, or use DNS over HTTPS (RFC 8484), which looks like ordinary web traffic. Arcom's own December 2025 study for the National Assembly found that 20% of French internet users already use an alternative DNS resolver and 29% use a VPN.
Quad9 compares the approach to holding a newspaper in front of a stadium to block the view of a concert. The comparison is blunt, but the technical point holds. DNS works on whole domains. A resolver can't block one infringing stream on a shared host without blocking everything else on that name.
The IETF's RFC 7754, the standard reference on blocking and filtering, puts it plainly: "From a technical perspective, there are no perfect or even good solutions -- there is only least bad." ICANN's security committee made a similar point in SAC127, "DNS Blocking Revisited" (2025), urging implementers to minimise overblocking and avoid affecting users outside their jurisdiction. AFNIC's scientific council reached the same conclusion years ago: "Le DNS n'a pas été conçu pour filtrer les contenus." (The DNS was not designed to filter content.)
Collateral Damage and the Problem of Opacity
Blocking at scale hurts bystanders. Italy's Piracy Shield system blocked Google Drive for much of the country in October 2024. A RIPE Labs study of Piracy Shield found more than 500 unrelated sites blocked and concluded that IP-level blocking is "an indiscriminate tool."
Opacity makes it worse. When a resolver is forced to lie, the user sees a site that won't load. They can't tell whether the site is down, their network is broken, or a court ordered the block. There is a standard for honesty here. RFC 8914, Extended DNS Errors, defines code 16, "Censored," for answers withheld "due to an external requirement imposed by an entity other than the operator." Nothing in the French orders requires resolvers to use it.
This next part matters more than it looks. Without that signal, users debug the wrong problem, blame their ISP, and never learn a court made the call.
What to Do If Your Network Uses Quad9
If you or your organisation resolve through 9.9.9.9 in France, you have about six days. Check the resolver setting on your routers, DHCP servers, and devices, and find every place it's hardcoded. Don't assume your ISP will fix it.
Pick a replacement based on what you need. Your options include an ISP resolver, another public resolver such as 1.1.1.1 or 8.8.8.8, or your own recursive resolver. Each choice carries trade-offs in privacy, malware filtering, and how it responds to court orders. Cloudflare, Google, and Cisco have all faced the same enforcement pressure, and some have already changed their French service.
Test after switching. Resolve a few domains you rely on, and check that internal names still work if you run your own DNS.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Quad9 and why is it leaving France?
Quad9 is a Swiss non-profit that runs the free 9.9.9.9 DNS resolver, which blocks known malware and phishing domains. It is leaving France on November 24, 2026, after a Paris court fined it €1,000 per day for refusing to block pirate sports-streaming domains for beIN Sports. Quad9 says it cannot afford the penalties piling up across about 20 pending cases.
When does Quad9 stop working in France?
Quad9 stops answering DNS queries from France on Tuesday, November 24, 2026. Networks that use 9.9.9.9 directly, or through a browser or device default, need to switch to another resolver before then. Quad9 has not said whether it will keep serving French users through any alternative channel.
How do I switch my DNS resolver before Quad9 leaves France?
Change the DNS server setting in your router, DHCP configuration, or device network settings to a resolver you trust, then test a few domains you rely on. Public options include Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 and Google's 8.8.8.8. For encrypted lookups, use DNS over HTTPS (RFC 8484) if your device supports it.
Why doesn't DNS blocking stop piracy?
DNS only maps names to addresses, so blocking a name doesn't remove the content from the server. Users can bypass the block by switching resolvers, using a VPN, or running their own resolver, which takes seconds. Arcom's December 2025 study found 20% of French internet users already use an alternative resolver.
Quad9 is leaving France, and the case shows where copyright enforcement is heading. Resolver operators are being asked to police content they cannot see, with penalties that add up faster than a non-profit can pay. If you run a network that depends on a public resolver, check your settings this week and confirm that the replacement you pick matches what your users need. Pass this to whoever manages DNS for your office or home lab before November 24.